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Recent Cases
consumers benefit when a business
follows the law, it is insufficient to
infer congressional intent in order to
give those consumers a private cause
of action. As the court noted, "Statland
cannot bootstrap consumers' rights
into a law that does not mention them."
The Seventh Circuit then examined Section 41 l(b)'s position within
the Aviation Act. In the original Aviation Act, Section 411 appeared as a
single paragraph granting the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) express
power to regulate deceptive practices
or unfair methods of competition in
the airline industry. The Airline Deregulation Act amended the Aviation
Act, transferring CAB' s duties to other
agencies. Section 411 (b), as amended,
contains two provisions, 411 (a) (411
as originally written) and 411 (b). Both
provisions deal with the CAB's authority over commercial practices of
the airline industry.
In Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332, 338-40 (3rd
Cir. 1975), the Third Circuit determined that Section 411(a) does not
create a private right to sue. The
Seventh Circuit, finding nothing suggesting Section 411 (b) should be read
differently, also interpreted Section
411(a) as failing to create a private
right to sue.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit read
the legislative history of Section
411 (b) as indicating Congress' intent
to give the DOT, not private parties,
the right to enforce its provisions.
Pointing to statements in the House
Report highlighting the importance of
consumer protection and the DOT's
regulatory role in this area, the court
concluded that the DOT, not private
parties, will enforce consumer protection rules against airlines.
In affirming the district court's
decision regarding Statland's federal
claim, the Seventh Circuit held that
Section 41 l(b)'s language, structure,
and legislative history all indicate
Congress' intent to establish the
DOT's regulatory power over airlines
without implying a private right of
action for consumers. Since a private
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right of action need not be implied to
further this intent, the court held that
Section 411 (b) does not create one.
State Claims Pre-empted
The Seventh Circuit also addressed
Statland's state law claims. Having
held that Section 411 (b) did not give
Statland a federal cause of action, the
court retained jurisdiction over
Statland's state law claims to conserve state court resources.
Turning to the state claims, the
court noted that the Airline Deregulation Act added an express pre-emption
clause to the Aviation Act, providing
that states shall not "enact or enforce
any law, rule, regulation, stand, or
other provision having the force and
effect of law relating to rates, rules or
services of any carrier." 49 U.S.C.
App. Section 1305(a). These words
"express a broad preemptive purpose,"
Morales v. Trans WorldAirlines,Inc.,
__ U.S.
. .
112 S.Ct. 2031,
2037, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992),
whereby canceled ticket refunds relate to rates. Thus, Statland's state
law claims, falling within this ambit,
were pre-empted. *oJudith Gorske
-

Spiller, but Not Shipper
of Spilled Chemical,
Liable for Environmental
Cleanup Under CERCLA
In Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex
Corp., 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993), the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that a chemical
manufacturer is a "responsible person" under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42
U.S.C. Section 9601, et. seq. (1980).
As a consequence, the Seventh Circuit extended liability under CERCLA
to a manufacturer for chemicals spilled
from its own trucks, but not for chemicals spilled from trucks owned by a

common carrier the manufacturer
hired for delivery of the chemicals.
Chemical Spill Harms
Environment
Plaintiff, Elkhart Products Corporation (Elkhart), a subsidiary of
Amcast Industrial Corporation, manufactures copper fittings at its Indiana
plant. It uses the solvent trichloroethylene (TCE) in the manufacturing
process. Elkhart purchased TCE from
a number of chemical manufacturers,
including defendant Detrex Corporation (Detrex). Detrex often delivered
TCE to Elkhart in its own tanker trucks.
However, Detrex also frequently hired
a common carrier, Transport Services,
to deliver the solvent to Elkhart.
In 1984, the groundwater beneath a
pharmaceutical plant adjacent to
Elkhart's facility was contaminated
with TCE. An investigation revealed
that both Detrex's and Transport Services' drivers spilled TCE accidentally on Elkhart's premises while filling Elkhart's storage tanks. Some of
this spillage seeped into the groundwater beneath the pharmaceutical
plant.
Elkhart spent more than $1 million
to clean up the TCE contamination.
Elkhart later sued Detrex in order to
recover from the cost of eliminating
the TCE contamination to Detrex. The
trial court granted partial summary
judgment for each party and entered
judgment against Detrex for the entire
cleanup cost Elkhart had incurred.
Detrex appealed the trial court's decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Detrex also filed a separate action in
district court for contribution against
Elkhart.
Response Costs, Facilities,and
Responsible Persons
CERCLA Section 9607(a)(1) imposes response costs, the costs of
eliminating an environmental hazard,
on the "owner and operator of a ...
facility" from which a hazardous substance has been released. CERCLA
Section 9607(a)(3) also places liabilLoyola Consumer Law Reporter
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ity on "any person who by contract ...
arranged for disposal or treatment, or
arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed
by such person." Furthermore, "facility" is defined under CERCLA Section 9601(9) as: "(A) any building,
structure, installation, equipment, pipe
or pipeline .

. .,

well, pit, pond, la-

goon, impoundment, ditch, landfill,
storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or
area where a hazardous substance has
been deposited, stored, disposed of,
or placed, or otherwise come to be
located."
In the instant case, Elkhart was a
"responsible person" under CERCLA
because the TCE spilled from its facility. CERCLA, however, under Section 9607(a)(4)(B), allows one responsible person to recover all or part of its
response costs from another responsible person. As a result, Elkhart
claimed that Detrex was also a responsible person because Detrex was
an owner of a facility and an arranger
for disposal or treatment of TCE.
Contributionfrom Responsible
Persons
Detrex initially argued that the
court should apportion responsibility
for the TCE cleanup costs between it
and Elkhart. The Seventh Circuit determined that Detrex could have counterclaimed to seek contribution for
the response costs fairly attributable
to Elkhart without conceding responsibility for the contamination. Instead, Detrex chose to wait and file a
separate action for contribution against
Elkhart in district court. Thus, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that
Detrex's first argument made no sense
and quickly rejected the claim.
In rejecting Detrex's claim, the
court affirmed CERCLA's provisions
regarding contribution among responsible persons. The Seventh Circuit
interpreted CERCLA to mean that
whoever incurs the costs of cleaning
up a contaminated site may proceed to
recover those costs from another reVolume 6 Number 2/Winter 1994

sponsible person. The responsible
person may then promptly counterclaim for a percentage of the costs it
thinks were due to the plaintiff's own
conduct.
Court Interprets "Facility"
Exception
In addition, Detrex asserted that it
was not within CERCLA's grasp because it did not own a "facility."
Elkhart responded to Detrex's argument by claiming that Detrex failed to
raise this "facility" issue in district
court and, as a consequence, forfeited
the argument on appeal.
The Seventh Circuit acknowledged
that an issue not raised in district court
cannot be used to reverse that court.
Nonetheless, case law has established
that where failure to preserve an issue
for appeal in district court constitutes
harmless error, the appellate court
possesses the power and the right to
permit the issue to be raised on appeal. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the issue of
whether or not Detrex's carrier trucks
composed a "facility" under CERCLA
was ripe for a decision, and that no
harm would be caused by Detrex raising the "facility" issue for the first
time at the appellate level.
The court initially determined that
the tanker trucks owned by Detrex
constituted a "facility" under the language of the statute. CERCLA also
defines disposal to include spilling.
Therefore, the Seventh Circuit found
that the trucks contained a hazardous
substance, TCE, and "disposed" of it
when they spilled it.
Next, the court recognized that "facility" under CERCLA excludes a
"consumer product in consumer use."
The court stated that the term "consumer product" applies equally to
products used by consumers, business
firms, and other institutions. The court
then addressed the question of whether
this reference to consumer product in
the definition of facility should be
read literally.
The Seventh Circuit held that the
consumer product exception should
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be read literally. If the exemption
were not taken literally, Elkhart would
not be a responsible person, even
though it used TCE in its ordinary
course of production. Rather, Elkhart
would become responsible once TCE
was discarded into a waste-disposal
pit on its premises. Furthermore, TCE
in Detrex's trucks would not be a
consumer product in consumer use
until it spilled. The TCE would also
cease to be in consumer use after the
spillage occurred. As a result, the
court concluded that a literal interpretation of the consumer product exception best furthered CERCLA's purpose.
Based on this literal interpretation
of the consumer product exception,
Detrex constituted a responsible person when the TCE its trucks were
carrying spilled and was no longer in
the trucks or any other property owned
by Detrex. Consequently, Detrex was
responsible for the environmental
damage resulting from the spillage by
its trucks.
Court Finds Chemical
Manufacturer,but Not Common
Carrier,Liable
Although Detrex was responsible
for the environmental damage caused
by the TCE spilled from its own trucks,
the Seventh Circuit determined that
Detrex was not responsible for the
TCE spillage from Transport Services'
trucks. According to the court, Detrex
would be responsible for spillage by
the common carrier's trucks under
CERCLA Section 9607(a)(3) only if
Detrex "arranged with a transporter
for transport for disposal or treatment"
of TCE. The court's critical analysis
revolved around the words "arranged
for" in the statute. While CERCLA
does not expressly define the terms
"arrange for," the court concluded that
these words imply intentional action.
Since Detrex only arranged for Transport Services to deliver the TCE to
Elkhart and did not arrange for the
carrier to spill it, Detrex could not be
held liable under CERCLA for Transport Services' spillage.
67
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Elkhart argued that because
CERCLA speaks of "disposal," and
"disposal" includes accidental spillage, Detrex should be held accountable for Transport Services' TCE
spillage. The Seventh Circuit decided
that in this particular context of a
product's transportation, "disposal"
excludes accidental spillage because
one does not arrange for an accident.
Therefore, CERCLA's words "arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment" refer to the
case where an individual desires to
dispose of hazardous waste and hires
a transportation company to carry the
waste to a disposal site.
In such a case, the shipper would
be a responsible person and liable for
cleanup costs. However, when the
shipper arranges for the delivery of a
useful hazardous product with a common carrier, it is not a responsible
person under CERCLA if spillage
occurs en route. Hence, under
CERCLA, Detrex was only liable for
the spillage of TCE from its own
trucks, and not from the trucks of
Transport Services. :.
Benjamin Malkin

Cryptic Exclusion
Endorsements on
Automobile Insurance
Policies Are Enforceable
In Dungey v. Haines & Britton,
Ltd., 614 N.E.2d 1205, (Ill. 1993), the
Illinois Supreme Court held that a renewed insurance policy assumes the
conditions of the original contract.
Therefore, a previous exclusion endorsement becomes part of a renewed
contract. In reversing the court of
appeals, the supreme court affirmed
the circuit court's judgment that a renewed policy was unambiguous, and a
driver named in an initial exclusion
endorsement was excluded from coverage under a renewed insurance
policy.
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Appellate Court Finds
Exclusionary Clause Ambiguous
In 1981, John and Shirley Dungey
obtained automobile insurance coverage through Haines & Britton, Ltd.
(Haines), an insurance broker. The
Economy Fire and Casualty Company
(Economy) issued Shirley Dungey an
insurance policy for a 1980 Plymouth
Horizon she owned with her husband.
As part of the policy, Shirley Dungey
signed a statement, called a "named
drivers exclusion endorsement,"
which excluded her husband, John
Dungey, from coverage due to his
poor driving record. At the bottom of
the endorsement, appeared the notation "CE-180."
One year later, when Shirley
Dungey renewed her insurance policy,
she again signed a named drivers exclusion endorsement excluding John
Dungey from coverage. The notation
"CE-303" appeared at the bottom of
this second endorsement. Shirley
Dungey subsequently renewed the
auto insurance policy on the Plymouth
Horizon many times. Yet, Economy
never again asked her to sign a named
driver exclusion endorsement. Instead, she received a declaration statement from Economy each time she
renewed her policy. The declaration
statement contained a preprinted line
entitled "Endorsement(s)," after which
were a series of numbers, including
"CE-303." This number correlated
with the second named drivers exclusion attached to the original policy
which Shirley Dungey signed to indicate that John Dungey was excluded
from insurance coverage.
In 1983, the Dungeys obtained a
second policy from Economy. Shirley
Dungey's son was listed as the primary driver on this policy. Moreover,
two cars previously insured under the
first policy, although at different times,
were insured under this second policy.
The premiums were higher and the
policy periods shorter on this policy
than on the first policy. No endorsement excluding John Dungey was required under this policy and the declaration statements sent to Shirley upon

renewal of this policy did not contain
the notation "CE-303."
In 1985, the Dungeys purchased a
1985 Chevrolet Sportsvan. Although
Shirley recalled telling her insurance
broker that John would be the primary
driver, the insurance company excluded her husband from the policy
because the van was added to the original 1981 policy.
On the same day the Dungeys added
the Chevrolet van to the first policy,
they obtained a third policy from
Economy for a 1984 Chrysler Laser
which had previously been insured
under Shirley's first policy. Both John
and Shirley were listed as drivers on
this policy that also had higher premiums and shorter periods than the first
policy.
On March 29, 1986, while John
Dungey was driving the 1985 van insured under the first policy, he had an
accident. The van was destroyed and
John was injured. Economy denied
the Dungeys' claim for coverage because Economy claimed the first
policy excluded John Dungey from
coverage.
The Dungeys filed a lawsuit to recover damages for breach of contract
and negligence against both Haines
and Economy. The plaintiffs and
Economy filed motions for summary
judgment. The trial judge granted
Economy's motion for summaryjudgment, finding as a matter of law that
the named drivers exclusion contained
in the policy excluded coverage and
was unambiguous. The trial court
also found that Haines was not an
agent of Economy and that Economy
would not be liable for Haines.
The plaintiffs appealed the trial
court's decision. The appellate court,
with one justice dissenting, reversed
the trial court's judgment. The appellate court held that the exclusionary
clause was ambiguous and that there
was a genuine issue of material fact
concerning the intent of the parties as
to the exclusion clause. Economy
filed a petition for leave to appeal,
which the Illinois Supreme Court
granted.
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